

FROM:

*ADD II*

DATE:

*22 Jun*

	TO	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS	STAT
DIR	<i>1</i>		<i>6/22</i>		
DEP/DIR	<i>2</i>		<i>6-22</i>		
EXEC/DIR	<i>3</i>				
ASST FOR ADMIN					
ASST FOR OPS	<i>4</i>		<i>23 June</i>		
<i>O/D 7/8</i>			<i>(1)</i>		
ASST FOR PA					
ASST FOR P&D					
CH/CSD					
CH/PD					
CH/PSD					
CH/TID	<i>6</i>		<i>30 June 64</i>		
CH/CIA/PID	<i>5</i>		<i>25 June</i>		
CH/DIA/NPIC					
CH/SPAD					
LO/NSA					

*✓*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:		16 June 64
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
6N212	213	
REMARKS:		
50X1		
FROM:		
DDI/CGS		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
7-F-33	HQ	

FORM NO. 1041

REPLACES FORM 36-2

☆ GPO : 1957

(47)

C O P Y**SECRET**


16 JUN 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE****SUBJECT: Capabilities of Peripheral Photography of Cuba**

1. Previous COMOR examination of this subject (USIB-D-41.14/137, COMOR-D-24/137, 1 May 1964) has resulted in the conclusion that peripheral reconnaissance could satisfy present requirements for coverage of coastal areas of Cuba, but limitations of range and resolution would prevent satisfactory coverage of inland activities.

2. These conclusions were based on the capabilities of the 100" camera, which is regarded as the best currently available for the purpose. This camera under optimum conditions can provide useable photography to a distance of 20 miles from the aircraft. The interpretability of the photography at the longer ranges, however, is minimal. Resolutions under the best operating conditions are 3 to 5 feet at 3 miles, 5 feet at 3 to 6 miles, and about 10 feet at greater distances. Assuming that the aircraft is flying 5 miles from the coast, maximum penetration would be only 15 miles inland.

3. Additional degrading features must also be considered. Obliquity itself has a degrading effect on scale and readability. At the greater distances from the camera, mere identification of the target itself is difficult, and meaningful interpretation is nearly impossible. Of equal importance is defile, or terrain obstructions. As will be recalled, the MRUM installations in Cuba were generally emplaced in a defile and were visible only from overhead. Trees and vegetation add to this problem. Finally there is the factor of atmospheric conditions. Clouds and haze have a much greater effect on slant range photography than on vertical.

**SECRET**

4. The attached map is designed to illustrate the maximum scope of peripheral photography, assuming optimum conditions as follows:

a. The flight track will maintain an offshore distance no greater than 5 miles.

b. The 100 inch camera will be used.

c. The maximum effective camera range is taken to be 20 miles. (The actual effective range, considering atmospheric effects and deterioration of resolution, probably will be less than half of this distance.)

d. Terrain obstacles, which also would reduce coverage, have not been taken into account.

5. The map indicates that coverage would be inadequate for present intelligence needs, because:

a. Only about half of the current COMOR targets could be covered.

b. Only 15 of the 27 Highest Priority targets could be covered.

c. Area coverage probably would not amount to more than 20 percent, which is unacceptable for search or surveillance purposes.

d. Coverage of targets of military interest in the Havana area would be fair to good, but coverage of central Cuban targets would be negligible.

6. Conclusion: Peripheral photography would be inadequate in both scope and quality to provide an acceptable alternative to U-2 reconnaissance in Cuba.

/ S /

R. JACK SMITH  
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachment: Map of Cuba

DDI/CGS/RECCE [ ] 15 June 1964)

Dist: Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - O/DD/I

1 - CGS Chrono

1 - DD/S&T

1 - NPIC (Mr. Lundahl)

50X1